

BMS for MTPL

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Reinsurers

- ⌘ **Reinsurers do not use a priori tarification.**
- ⌘ **Reinsurers only rely on past statistics and current exposure.**
- ⌘ **Reinsurers provide a posteriori tarifications !**
- ⌘ **Often their rates are retrospective !**
- ⌘ **Reinsurers do not have tariffs.**
- ⌘ **Reinsurers immediately react to changing conditions.**

Insurers

- ⌘ Insurers may rely on mass marketing.
- ⌘ Insurers are able to price a priori.
- ⌘ Insurers set up a priori tariffs.
- ⌘ Insurers set up a posteriori tariffs.
- ⌘ Insurers do (or should) react immediately to changing conditions.
- ⌘ They don't with compulsory BMS.

Belgian BMS

- ⌘ Born in 1971.
- ⌘ Adapted in 1992.
- ⌘ Scale with 23 steps : from 0 to 22.
- ⌘ Transition rule : -1 per year ; +5 per accident (limited to 0 and 22).
- ⌘ New driver enters the system at level 11.

Belgian BMS

Step	%	Step	%	Step	%
0	54%	8	73%	16	111%
1	54%	9	77%	17	117%
2	54%	10	81%	18	123%
3	57%	11	85%	19	130%
4	60%	12	90%	20	140%
5	63%	13	95%	21	160%
6	66%	14	100%	22	200%
7	69%	15	105%		

A priori segmentation

- ⌘ Aim : provide classes of homogeneous policyholders.**
- ⌘ Covariables are : sex, age, use of car, power of car, garage, color of car, ...**
- ⌘ Other covariables influencing the level of risk are missed : reflex of the driver, use of alcohol/drugs, ...**
- ⌘ Conclusion : homogeneity is not perfect. Antiselection may be present.**

A posteriori tarification

- ⌘ Observed claims are used to replace missing covariables. Observed claims are used in order to decrease the antiselection effect.**
- ⌘ BMS are an example of a posteriori tarification in a tariff setup.**

Aims of BMS are

- ⌘ Reducing antiselection.**
- ⌘ Reducing moral hasard.**
- ⌘ Policyholders expect to pay premiums as fair as possible !**

A posteriori vs a priori

- ⌘ Missing covariables depend of used covariables.**
- ⌘ Assume insurer A : uses sex and age.**
- ⌘ Assume insurer B : uses sex, age and domicile.**
- ⌘ Both insurers miss the covariable reflex of the driver.**

A posteriori vs a priori

- ⌘ For insurer A, domicile and reflex are missing covariables.**
- ⌘ For insurer B, only reflex is a missing covariable.**
- ⌘ Elasticity of BMS A should be larger than elasticity BMS B.**

A posteriori vs a priori

- ⌘ A posteriori (which accounts for missing covariables) has to be a function of a priori tarification.**
- ⌘ Assume a uniform BMS for insurer B.**
- ⌘ Assume (a priori) good drivers from Arlon and bad drivers from Brussels.**
- ⌘ With B, good drivers : 300 EUR ; bad drivers : 500 EUR.**

A posteriori vs a priori

- ⌘ Assume both drivers do not produce any claim on a 5 years period.**
- ⌘ If unique BMS, both drivers receive the same bonus in %.**
- ⌘ Question : is this logical ?**
- ⌘ A priori bad driver shows he/she is good : a priori bad driver should receive a higher bonus in % !**

A posteriori vs a priori

- ⌘ Conclusion : good and bad drivers should have their own BMS : faster reductions for the (a priori) bad driver, slower reductions for the (a posteriori) good driver.**
- ⌘ A posteriori tarification is dependent of a priori tarification.**

A posteriori vs a priori

	Good		Bad	
Step	%	Premium	%	Premium
5	100%	300	100%	500
4	90%	270	80%	400
3	80%	240	65%	325
2	70%	210	50%	250
1	60%	180	40%	200

Changing conditions

- ⌘ **Presence of BMS, new driving rules imply general reduction of claims frequency.**
- ⌘ **The lower the claims frequency, the slower the reductions, and the faster the increases.**
- ⌘ **When conditions change, BMS should be adapted !**

Hunger for bonus

- ⌘ **Due to our current BMS, some drivers do not report all their claims.**
- ⌘ **Small claims are not reported due to future premium increases.**
- ⌘ **Observed frequency is lower than true frequency.**
- ⌘ **Observed severity has larger mean than true severity.**
- ⌘ **Advantage : reduction of administrative costs.**

Changing the BMS

- ⌘ **Need for statistical material.**
- ⌘ **Data are censored due to the hunger for bonus.**
- ⌘ **New BMS will most probably imply a new kind of hunger for bonus.**
- ⌘ **Problem extremely difficult to tackle.**

Conclusion

- ⌘ **On the one hand EU asks for a non compulsory / non uniform BMS.**
- ⌘ **On the other hand : actuarial reasons for working with non uniform BMS.**
- ⌘ **Obviously simplicity is required for commercial reasons.**
- ⌘ **Complex methods are possible in the back office.**
- ⌘ **Insurers should take the opportunity to propose innovative solutions !**